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Abstract. Growing number of network devices and services have led
to increasing demand for protective measures as hackers launch attacks
to paralyze or steal information from victim systems. Intrusion Detec-
tion System (IDS) is one of the essential elements of network perimeter
security which detects the attacks by inspecting network traffic packets
or operating system logs. While existing works demonstrated effective-
ness of various machine learning techniques, only few of them utilized
the time-series information of network traffic data. Also, categorical in-
formation has not been included in neural network based approaches.
In this paper, we propose network intrusion detection models based on
sequential information using long short-term memory (LSTM) network
and categorical information using the embedding technique. We have
experimented the models with UNSW-NB15, which is a comprehensive
network traffic dataset. The experiment results confirm that the pro-
posed method improve the performance, observing binary classification
accuracy of 99.72%.
Keywords: Network Intrusion Detection · Machine Learning · Long
Short-Term Memory · Feature Embedding
1 Introduction
Growing number of network devices and services have increased the importance
of network security. There is an increasing demand for protective measures as
hackers launch attacks to paralyze or steal information from computer systems
connected to network. Examples of these attacks are transmission of malicious
files and exploitation of security vulnerability of targets [4]. In such attacks, hack-
ers interact with the target system, generating network activity [26]. Network
Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) is one of the essential elements of network
perimeter security which analyzes these activities and raises alarms [22]. Specif-
ically, NIDS analyzes the header and payload data of incoming and outgoing
network packets, and it invokes alerts when detecting a malicious network ac-
tivity [15].
There are two approaches for detection of malicious network activities: tra-
ditional methods and machine learning based ones [9]. Both of them involve
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feature extraction stage, but differ in how to identify malicious activity. In the
feature extraction approach, individual packets in network activities are summa-
rized into high level events such as sessions [1]. Each summarized record consists
of feature values that characterize the high level event [31]. Then, in traditional
development of NIDS, security experts identify patterns of attacks, deciding
threshold ranges for each features [9]. On the other hand, in the machine learn-
ing based approach, a given model automatically learns patterns of malicious
activities from a given dataset [4]. Recently, machine learning based methods
have been attracting more attention over traditional methods, due to its po-
tential capability to detect more complicated patterns in a large scale dataset
[29].
While many researchers have experimented various machine learning tech-
niques, time-series information of network traffic data have not received much
attention [4,29]. As network activity occurs in timely manner, usage of sequen-
tial information in machine learning models should lead to more comprehensive
analysis as long as the model has enough computational capacity for such ad-
ditional information. Recurrent neural networks (RNNs) can capture temporal
dependence in data, which brought significant advances in the fields of speech
recognition and machine translation [17,3], and long short-term memory (LSTM)
[13] or gated recurrent unit (GRU) [6] are popular RNNs [10].
In addition to temporal dependence, categorical information has been ne-
glected in neural network based NIDS. Categorical information means non-
numeric (or symbolic) features like protocol type, state, and service in network
traffic data. While such features are crucial in recognizing malicious pattern ac-
tivity, traditional neural network approaches could not accept them as input.
Categorical features are very common in natural language processing (NLP),
because words are symbols, and there are several feature embedding (or word
embedding) techniques [25,8] to handle symbolic words in NLP tasks, like lan-
guage model and neural machine translation [16,3].
In this paper, we propose to apply LSTM and feature embedding to build in-
trusion detection models, where sequential information of network traffic data is
captured by LSTM and categorical features are utilized with feature embedding.
For evaluation, after checking open datasets for network intrusion detection, we
use the UNSW-NB15 dataset [18], which is an up-to-date dataset for network
intrusion detection. We assume that records are arranged in timely order, which
is to capture temporal dependence for intrusion detection. In experiments, we
present that LSTM can effectively model sequential structures for NIDS and
feature embedding can make categorical features available in the neural net-
work models. Finally, after many experiments with various options and hyper
parameters, LSTM with feature embedding leads to significant improvement in
detection performance compared to other machine learning techniques. We have
achieved binary classification accuracy of 99.72% over the UNSW-NB15 dataset.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related works and backgrounds
are described in Section 2. In Section 3, we propose new network intrusion de-
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tection models. The experiment results are presented and analyzed in Section 4,
followed by Section 5 where we conclude the paper.
2 Background
2.1 Network Intrusion Detection Data
As an open dataset, we use the UNSW-NB15 dataset, which is a broad-gauge
network intrusion detection dataset. UNSW-NB15 was created for standardized
evaluation of NIDS [18]. Especially, it aimed to replace the KDD Cup 99 and
NSL-KDD datasets, which have been popular datasets for NIDS over the years,
but do not convey newly emerging network attack behaviors. As specified in
[18], in order to reflect contemporary hacking behaviors, attacks in UNSW-NB15
were generated using IXIA Perfect Storm, which can simulate attacks listed in
CVE website. After arranging a testbed environment with the attack generator,
traffic was captured by TCP dump. Then the final dataset was formulated by
conducting feature extraction with tools such as Bro and Argus.
2.2 Network Intrusion Detection Method
IDS has two detection mechanisms according to definitions of malicious activity
[9]. Signature-based detection mechanism defines malicious activities, and rec-
ognizes behaviors that match the attacks. In contrast, anomaly-based detection
mechanism defines normal activity, and recognizes behaviors that deviate from
the normal ones. The former mechanism is more compatible with attacks that
are already known and shows low false-positive rate compared to the latter. On
the other hand, the latter has potential to recognize unknown attacks, but it can
suffer from high false-positive rate.
About the two detection mechanisms, there are corresponding development
approaches for NIDS: expert-centered and machine learning based ones [9]. In
expert-centered approach, signatures are written by security experts. For ex-
ample, Snort, a renowned open-source project for NIDS, lets user write rules
by which it examines network packets and creates alerts [22]. This approach
requires expert knowledge or rule sets. In the latter approach, on the other
hand, signatures are automatically learned by machine learning models. Also,
it requires a dataset which contains massive amount of data and corresponding
labels specifying attack type of each datum [4].
As pointed out in [21,4], some challenges should still be addressed for de-
ployment of machine learning based NIDS to real network environments. In
addition, experiment over an open dataset assumes that network traffic can be
pre-processed in advance [31]. Nevertheless, experiments are useful for evaluation
of potential detection performance of different machine learning techniques.
After publication of UNSW-NB15, there have been many research works to
apply myriad of machine learning techniques to the dataset. Suleiman et al.
applied various classical machine learning algorithms such as Random Forest,
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K-nearest neighbor, and Support Vector Machine [28]. Among the experiments,
J48 and K-NN algorithms were proposed as the most suitable models with high
efficiency and accuracy. Moustafa et al. experimented anomaly-based detection
method based on geometric area analysis using trapezoidal area estimation [19].
Meanwhile, Papamarztivanos et al. proposed a novel approach to NIDS with ge-
netic algorithm and decision tree [24]. In their work, they used genetic algorithm
to produce detection rules that compose a decision-tree model. The resulting
model was experimented over UNSW-NB15, and it showed good performance in
detecting both attacks that are common and rare in the dataset.
Recently, Tama et al. experimented effectiveness of deep neural networks
(DNNs) for NIDS on UNSW-NB15 [2]. In addition, VinayaKumar et al. car-
ried out comparative analysis of DNN models and classical machine learning
algorithms [30]. After conducting extensive parameter search for optimization,
they concluded that DNNs were suitable for development of IDS. Furthermore,
Nawir et al. discovered Average One Dependence Encoder (AODE) achieves high
accuracy with relatively short amount of classification time [20].
While previous works demonstrated various machine-learning-based NIDS,
most of them did not pay attention to sequential information. As exceptions,
Staudemeyer applied long short-term memory (LSTM) network to the KDD99
dataset to improve classification performance [27]. In addition, Kim et al. ex-
perimented an LSTM-RNN model on KDD99 and obtained significant perfor-
mance improvement [14]. However, their experiments were performed based on
the KDD99 dataset, which does not reflect contemporary attack behaviors. More-
over, the previous LSTM models used categorical features as if the features are
continuous ordinal data. Categorical features need feature embedding like word
embedding in NLP [11].
2.3 Long Short-Term Memory
In this section, we briefly review recurrent neural network (RNN) and LSTM.
For more information, the readers are referred to [13,7,27,23].
RNN is a modified version of neural network that updates its internal state
over time. By forming circular connections within the network, RNNs can mem-
orize past inputs and capture temporal properties in sequential data. However,
RNNs can retain memory for only a short amount of time steps due to the van-
ishing gradient problem. LSTM [13] solves the vanishing gradient problem by
introducing three gates (input, forget and output) around special memory units
called cell states ct. The gates control the update of the cell states as shown in
Fig. 1.
In LSTM, inferences for the cell states ct and hidden states ht are given by
ct = ft  ct−1 + it  tanh(Uht−1 +Wxt + b), (1)
ht = ot  tanh(ct), (2)
Network Intrusion Detection based on LSTM and Feature Embedding 5
Fig. 1. Structure of LSTM Cell. Adopted from [17]
where  indicates the element-wise multiplication operation, and the three gates
are defined by
it = σ(Wixt + Uiht−1 + bi), (3)
ft = σ(Wfxt + Ufht−1 + bf ), (4)
ot = σ(Woxt + Uoht−1 + bo). (5)
Here, σ is the sigmoid function, and U , W , and b are parameters. For imple-
mentation convenience without degradation of performance as recommended in
[10], peephole connections are not included.
2.4 Word Embedding
To use categorical (or nominal) values like words in natural language processing
in neural networks, the values should be projected into a continuous vector
space, called word embedding, which captures relations among nominal values
and represents them in a vector space [11] as shown in Fig. 2. In our experiments,
feature embedding will also be included in our network architecture, which leads
to better performance.
Given a categorical variable x ∈ 1, 2, . . . , T , where T is the number of possible
values that x can take. Let f be a simple function from x to e, where e is a one-
hot vector in a T dimensional space, and only the xth element of e is one and the
others are zeros. Then the vector representation of x is defined as W ∗ e, where
W is the embedding matrix with the shape of (T ×D), and D is the embedding
dimension in which the categorical variable will be represented. In practice, W ∗e
might be implemented in a different way that the xth column of W is selected,
which is more efficient rather than the matrix-vector multiplication.
The weight matrix W represents weights connecting one-hot layer to embed-
ding layer. Notice that weights can be initialized with random values and be
trained just as other parameters in neural networks. Once a categorical variable
is projected into a continuous vector, then the vector can be concatenated with
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Fig. 2. Embedded words in a continuous vector space. Words are represented as vectors
with semantic meaning.
other continuous input feature values, and the combined data travels to upper
neural network layers.
3 Intrusion Detection based on LSTM
Network intrusions have patterns according to their types. Generally, those pat-
terns do not appear in a single packet, but can be dispersed for multiple packets.
However, most of the previous machine learning methods for NIDS failed to ad-
dress such characteristic, and they were not able to capture patterns that appear
in multiple packets. For example, multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) performs intru-
sion detection with only one packet ignoring temporal dependency. Actually, if
you want to detect DoS attack with MLP, it would be very tough because DoS
is an attack to bring down a server by sending many packets, each of which
is not very different from normal packets. This issue might not be limited to
DoS attack, but also for other attack types. For more accurate intrusion detec-
tion, therefore, it is necessary to deal with multiple packets rather than a single
packet.
In this study, we use LSTM to detect whether or not the current packet
is normal considering the previous packets. The current packet and previous
packets are put into LSTM as inputs as in Fig. 3.
However, there are several different ways to train the network or to construct
our network architecture. First, the network can be trained with the final label
corresponding to the current packet or with all the labels to the current and the
past packets. Second, the network can be constructed for binary classification
(‘normal’ or ‘attack’) or multiple classification (‘normal’ or several attack types).
Even for binary classification, we can train a model for multiple classification
and classify all types of attack as a single class ‘attack’ as in binary classification.
Network Intrusion Detection based on LSTM and Feature Embedding 7
Fig. 3. Intrusion detection through multiple packets
Further, the network can be constructed with or without embedding layer which
is for categorical features.
3.1 Many-To-Many Train vs. Many-To-One Train
Given sequential packets, NIDS is to perform many-to-one classification where
the current input is classified using sequential packets as in Fig. 3. That is, given
many input steps, the output is determined only for the last step. Basically,
RNNs like LSTM take one input packet at a time and yield a prediction output
at each time step. Therefore, it is natural to train the model only with the last
error as in many-to-one classification as in Fig. 4(a), which is called many-to-one
(M2O) training. However, it is possible to use all the errors for training as in Fig.
4(b) if the labels are available, because the labels for the previous packets have
some information which accelerate the training process, which is called many-to-
many (M2M) training. That is, in the M2M strategy, not only the attack type
of the target packet but also the attack type of the previous packets are learned
together. We compare two training approaches in experiments.
3.2 Multi Classes to Binary Class Detection
There are various types of network intrusions, and multi-classification might be
of interest. Sometimes, however, it would be interesting to classify a packet as
normal or abnormal. For that, there are two approaches. First, various attack
types of packets can be converted into ‘attack’ before training. Then, the model
is trained to classify a packet into binary results (‘normal’ or ‘attack’). Alterna-
tively, without converting multiple attack types into a single class ‘attack’, the
model can be trained for multiple classification and the prediction results can
be merged into binary classification results as in Fig. 5. That is, basically the
model performs multi-classification, but if the prediction is one of attack types,
then it is classified to ‘attack’. We call it multi-to-binary (M2B) classification.
3.3 Detection With Feature Embedding
Network packets (or connection) contain several nominal (or categorical) features
like protocol and state. Each nominal feature indicates what role the packet
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(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Two learning methods: (a) M2O training learns only the last output, and (b)
M2M training learns all the outputs in the sequence.
plays and in what state it is. Each feature has characteristics that distinguish
one packet from other packets with different nominal values. However, different
values of one feature can have a very similar behavior by its functions. Therefore,
simply replacing the nominal features with one-hot encoding vector may not be
enough to represent packets. We apply the feature embedding technique to make
each nominal feature a suitable vector in a continuous vector space according to
the attack types.
As in NMT [8], all nominal features are initialized to random vectors. With
training, the vectors converge to appropriate points depending on packet’s attack
types. For example, TCP and UDP often appear in the same attack type, so
they are located closely in the vector space after training. With all embedded
category features, our model could improve the detection performance utilizing
relationships between nominal features.
4 Experiments
4.1 Dataset
To evaluate our proposed method for network intrusion detection system, we
adopted the UNSW-NB15 dataset [18]. UNSW-NB15 is an open dataset pub-
lished by UNSW, a university in Australia, for network intrusion detection re-
search in 2015. The KDD Cup 99 dataset used to be extensively used for network
intrusion detection research in the past, but more recently UNSW-NB15 has
been used because KDD Cup 99 does not contain much of the recent network
hacking patterns [18]. UNSW-NB15 consists of nine attack types and normal
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(a) (b)
Fig. 5. M2B classification: (a) The model is trained to perform multi-classification, (b)
The prediction results are merged into binary classification results.
type as described in Table 1. The dataset consists of 3 nominal, 2 binary, and 37
numerical features. The dataset splits into two sets: training(175,341 packets)
and testing(82,332 packets). From the training set, 10% of randomly selected
samples are put aside and used for validation.
In addition, the records of UNSW-NB15 are sorted in chronological order,
which provides sequential patterns [18].
Table 1. UNSW-NB15 Dataset Attack Type
Category Train Test
Total Records 175,341 (100%) 82,332(100%)
Normal 56,000(31.94%) 37,000(44.94%)
Analysis 2,000(1.14%) 677(0.82%)
Backdoor 1,746(1.00%) 583(0.71%)
Dos 12,264(6.99%) 4,089(4.97%)
Exploits 33,393(19.04%) 11,132(13.52%)
Fuzzers 18,184(10.37%) 6,062(7.36%)
Generic 40,000(22.81%) 18,871(22.92%)
Reconnaissance 10,491(5.98%) 3,496(4.25%)
Shellcode 1,133(0.65%) 378(0.46%)
Worms 130(0.07%) 44(0.05%)
10 Gwon et al.
4.2 Model Architecture
Fig. 6. Model Architecture: embedding, LSTM, and fully connected layers. ‘Fully Con-
nected 2’ is used only for binary classification.
Our model is composed of 3 types of layers: embedding, LSTM, and fully
connected layers. The embedding layer is only for nominal features of an input,
and continuous features are set aside. 3 nominal features (proto, service, and
state) are mapped to 5, 3, and 2 dimensional vectors, respectively. These output
vectors are concatenated to continuous features and travel to the next layer in the
model. The LSTM layer is composed of hidden state with 100 nodes. The fully
connected layer is of size 50 with dropout. As activation function, leaky ReLU
[12] is applied for non-linear transformation. In case of binary classification, the
second fully connected layer is added with size of 10 nodes. In Fig. 6, the dotted
line indicates the layer working only in case of binary classification.
4.3 Evaluation Metrics
As evaluation metrics, we used accuracy (AC) and F1-score (F1). Given true
positive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP), and false negative (FN),
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AC and F1 are respectively calculated by
AC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (6)
F1 =
2P ∗R
P +R
, (7)
where P and R stand for precision and recall, respectively as follows.
P =
TP
TP + FP
, (8)
R =
TP
TP + FN
. (9)
As the harmonic mean of precision and recall, F1-score provides a better evalu-
ation measure than accuracy especially for imbalanced data.
4.4 Experiment Results
We evaluate many combination of training configurations on LSTM with fea-
ture embedding. First, the LSTM model is trained in two ways as we described
above. One is learning from errors of every output (M2M) and the other one is
learning only from the error of the last output (M2O). In addition, for binary-
classification, we add ‘multi-classification to binary-classification’ (M2B) which
trains a multi-classification model and converts all of malicious labels and out-
puts of model to the same label ‘attack’. Finally, feature embedding (EMB) is
applied to every models.
Table 2. Binary-classification LSTM Model results for test data. Validation results
are in the parenthesis.
Model Sequence Length Accuracy F1 Score
ANN [28] - 81.91 95.2
RepTree [5] - 88.95 -
Random Forest [30] - 90.3 92.4
MLP - 83.55 (94.00) 86.89
LSTM(M2M) 110 98.68 (99.88) 99.16
LSTM(M2O) 310 98.49 (97.99) 98.90
LSTM(M2M M2B) 130 98.29 (99.84) 98.43
LSTM(M2O M2B) 210 99.42 (98.07) 99.47
LSTM(M2M + EMB) 270 99.72 (99.97) 99.75
LSTM(M2O + EMB) 90 99.52 (97.82) 99.56
LSTM(M2M M2B + EMB) 110 99.53 (99.93) 99.67
LSTM(M2O M2B + EMB) 110 98.83 (98.02) 98.93
MLP model and LSTM models have apparent differences in terms of perfor-
mances as summarized in Tables 2 and 3. The MLP model shows the accuracy of
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Table 3. Multi-classification LSTM Model results. Validation results are in the paren-
thesis.
Model Sequence Length Accuracy
Random Forest [30] - 75.5
RepTree [5] - 81.28
MLP - 72.81 (79.32)
LSTM(M2M) 20 84.78 (85.52)
LSTM(M2O) 250 83.45 (82.72)
LSTM(M2M + EMB) 30 86.98 (88.50)
LSTM(M2O + EMB) 150 85.93 (83.00)
83.55% and 72.81% for binary-classification and multi-classification, respectively.
The corresponding F1 score for the binary case is 86.89%. The LSTM models
show the accuracy over 98% in binary-classification (F1 score of 99.75%) and
83% in multi-classification. The LSTM models outperform because LSTM can
capture the temporal dependency presented in sequence of packets, while MLP
cannot. In addition, our LSTM models outperform the previous works [28,5,30]
Fig. 7. Binary-classification accuracy graphs on the validation data: M2M, and M2M
with embedding. The horizontal axis indicates the length of sequence.
Among the LSTM models, the M2M+EMB model achieved the highest per-
formance for both binary and multiple classification tasks. It is because cate-
gorical features includes distinguishable information and feature embedding is
efficient to capture the information for neural networks. Actually, when com-
paring EMB models to corresponding non-EMB models, the EMB models have
better performance (around 1% higher for binary classification and 2% higher
for multi-classification) and more stable results as shown in Figs. 7 and 8.
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Fig. 8. Multi-classification accuracy graphs on the validation data: M2M, and M2M
with embedding. The horizontal axis indicates the length of sequence.
In addition, for binary-classification, M2B can be applied, but makes no
significant influence on performance. The results of M2B and non-M2B models
are almost the same.
For practical consideration, we checked the prediction time with different
sequence length in the model, and the results are summarized in Fig. 9, where
we can see that the prediction time is linear to the sequence length.
Fig. 9. Prediction time in seconds per sequence with various sequence lengths.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed and experimented several IDS models based on LSTM
and feature embedding. Evaluation was based on the UNSW-NB15 dataset which
is suitable to reflect latest network traffic patterns. LSTM outperformed MLP
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with a significant margin (around 16% point or 13%) in accuracy and F1 score.
Among LSTM models, the one with feature embedding was the best, since the
embedding technique could capture categorical information which is crucial for
attack recognition.
We expect that real-time detection is possible in practice. Our future work
includes making the model compatible with embedded system and Internet of
things (IoT) by reducing the model complexity and shortening the necessary
sequence length.
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